Credit: IISD/ENB – Kiara Worth
By Baboloki Semele: In the quiet, rain-dappled streets of Bonn, Germany, negotiators from nearly 200 nations once again converged for the mid-year UN climate talks formally known as the 62nd sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB62) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Though technically a preparatory conference for the more politically charged COP30 scheduled for November in Belém, Brazil, this year’s Bonn meeting carried more weight than usual. With the shadow of geopolitical instability, climate finance shortfalls, and rising skepticism about multilateral cooperation looming overhead, the question wasn’t simply what progress would be made but whether the multilateral process itself could still deliver results. Much of the anxiety in Bonn stemmed from the state of the world beyond the negotiation rooms. The global political landscape has deteriorated further since COP29 in Baku, with the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency, escalating regional conflicts, and dwindling foreign aid contributions from donor nations. The US, notably absent from Bonn altogether, loomed over the discussions as a silent spectre, a reminder of both the fragility and urgency of climate diplomacy. It was in this tense atmosphere that the Brazilian COP30 presidency, led by seasoned climate diplomat Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, attempted to re-center the process. A pre-Bonn letter from the presidency invited parties to reflect not only on thematic negotiations but also on the future of the process itself. Many welcomed the call for introspection, especially as the Paris Agreement marks its 10th anniversary this year. The idea of reforming the UNFCCC process was not new, but it gained renewed traction in Bonn. One official note acknowledged the growing complexity of the talks, pointing to an overwhelming number of agenda items, over 50 and mandated events of more than 30. Delegates discussed concrete proposals to make the system more efficient: capping delegation sizes, retiring outdated agenda items, and even setting limits on the number of new issues each session could adopt. A notable civil society proposal signed by over 200 NGOs called for a shift away from consensus-based decision-making, advocating for majority voting in situations where one or two countries obstruct progress.
This publication virtually followed proceedings, also borrowing from experts in the field via social media interactions and daily reads. While these proposals energized conversations in the margins, actual reform remained elusive. Instead, the discussion around reform will continue at COP30.
Erika Lennon, a senior attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law, captured the mood:
“Parties wanted to keep discussing efficiency, but couldn’t reach agreement on concrete proposals.” The discussions on intergovernmental arrangements normally confined to Bonn will now become a feature at Belém.
These meta-level conversations did not halt the technical negotiations, which pressed forward across multiple streams. Perhaps none was more contentious or urgent than the issue of climate adaptation. Unlike mitigation, where progress is measured by emissions reductions, adaptation lacks universally accepted metrics. This gap in measurability has long hindered accountability and action. In 2023, COP28 in Dubai produced a framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), setting out thematic areas such as food, water, health, and ecosystems. But the task of defining how to measure progress within these areas through a streamlined list of indicators was deferred to this year. When experts arrived in Bonn, they had managed to reduce a sprawling list of 9,000 potential indicators to 490. The goal is to finalize around 100 key indicators by COP30. At first glance, this seemed manageable. A mandated event on the first day allowed experts to present their consolidated work, and delegates initially welcomed it. But soon, fault lines emerged.
Developing countries, led by the G77 and China, emphasized that means of implementation primarily financial support must be reflected in the indicators. Without guaranteed finance, they argued, adaptation plans are meaningless. Many developed countries resisted this, arguing that finance indicators are outside the GGA’s scope or could undermine national sovereignty. Some even balked at proposals requiring developing countries to disclose domestic adaptation spending, fearing such disclosures could be weaponized to justify withholding international assistance.
Lisa Schipper, a professor at the University of Bonn and a contributing author to the IPCC, noted the deep inequities embedded in the discussions.
“It’s a colonial practice,” she said bluntly. “Countries create climate change and then make the countries that are most affected jump through hoops just to get access to funding.”
Even with disagreements simmering, progress was made. Negotiators agreed on a structure that includes globally applicable headline indicators, supplemented by sub-indicators that could be tailored to national contexts. However, fundamental issues like the role of finance remained bracketed in draft texts, and the timeline for finalizing the indicators remained unclear. On the final day of SB62, negotiators continued to haggle late into the night. A draft text was only published midway through the final plenary session, drawing complaints from parties who had no time to review it.
In the end, parties agreed to task the co-facilitators with streamlining the list of indicators and delivering a technical report by August 2025. The most politically charged sections on the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and transformational adaptation were stripped from the final conclusions and relegated to an informal note to be picked up at COP30. Beyond the GGA, negotiations on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) were another casualty of procedural dysfunction. Discussions resumed with little momentum after COP29 failed to produce a decision. A disorganized and bracket-riddled draft text from Baku stymied progress. The G77 and China proposed restructuring the text into clearer sections, but developed countries particularly the EU and UK resisted efforts to reopen its structure. Once negotiations finally resumed, divisions over financial support again stalled any consensus. Ultimately, parties left Bonn without agreement on the NAPs, pushing the issue to Brazil.
The frustration among observers was palpable. Jeffrey Qi, a policy advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable Development, called it a disappointing outcome.
“We’re leaving Bonn with essentially the same messy, unbalanced text from Baku,” he said. “Without compromise, we’re going to see the same procedural jujitsu in Belém.”
Other adaptation-related negotiations, including on the Adaptation Fund, adaptation communications, and the Adaptation Committee, similarly ended with only procedural conclusions. Talks on the Adaptation Fund touched on its board membership and its relationship to the Paris Agreement, but no consensus was reached on governance. Negotiators agreed only to extend submission deadlines for further party input.
Meanwhile, outside the negotiation halls, civil society actors kept up pressure on the process. Rallies and creative protests called for the tripling of adaptation finance, especially as the 2025 deadline approaches for the goal set in Glasgow at COP26 to double adaptation funding from 2019 levels.
The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report of 2024 confirmed that even if the doubling target were met, it would only account for about 5% of the adaptation needs in developing countries. This demand for finance reverberated throughout nearly every negotiation track, even those not directly linked to adaptation. The influence of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) negotiations from COP29 in Baku, largely seen as a failure, was deeply felt.
Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London, noted that “the real legacy of the NCQG is showing up everywhere.” Week one, she said, brought some momentum, but it all ground to a halt over unresolved finance questions by week two.
In the broader mitigation space, progress was modest. The global stocktake; the Paris Agreement’s five-year accountability mechanism remained under discussion, but many felt that Bonn offered little movement on how to translate its outcomes into policy shifts. The COP30 presidency hopes to make the stocktake a centerpiece in Belém, especially in clarifying what transitioning away from fossil fuels means in practice. As SB62 drew to a close, it became clear that Bonn had accomplished just enough to keep the process moving, but not enough to provide confidence that COP30 would be smooth sailing. The Brazilian presidency has laid out 30 wide-ranging objectives for the November summit, from renewable energy expansion to water security. But unless countries bridge their divides on finance and implementation, the risk remains that COP30 could replicate the gridlock of Baku and Bonn. This year’s Bonn climate talks offered a mirror, not just to the political state of climate action, but to the very institutions meant to deliver it. In a world increasingly skeptical of multilateralism, the UN climate process remains one of the few global venues for dialogue and consensus. But as the process becomes ever more complex, and the stakes continue to rise, the challenge is no longer just reaching agreements. It is whether those agreements can be implemented in time to matter.